Sangha and State-Religion Relations: Secularism, Pluralism, and the Middle Path.

 Title: Sangha and State-Religion Relations: Secularism, Pluralism, and the Middle Path.


Author: Dr. Shekhar and Team

Affiliation: Psychology Doctor's Forum for All 🏥⚖️



Abstract


What does the Sangha teach us about the relationship between religion and the state? Not the Sangha as a religious institution, but the Sangha as a political experiment. The Buddha did not establish a theocracy. He established a community. He did not seek political power. He sought to create a space where the pursuit of liberation could flourish without interference. This article examines what the Sangha model offers to contemporary debates on secularism, religious pluralism, and the "middle path" in state-religion relations. Drawing on published research from 2000 to 2025, it reviews the historical Sangha-state relationship in Theravada societies, the constitutional experiments of Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Cambodia, and the philosophical resources within Buddhism for a pluralistic politics. Research on Thai public administration shows that the Buddhist king's constitutionally defined role as "upholder of religions—in the plural" has created a form of "covenantal pluralism" that accommodates religious diversity. But the same research reveals a paradox: state obligations to protect Buddhism have resulted in heavy sangha regulation and, in some cases, deepened rather than diminished religious conflict. The article argues that the Sangha model offers a middle path—neither theocracy nor hostile secularism—but that it requires constant vigilance to prevent the "rightful place" of the majority religion from becoming the displacement of all others. We do not have a problem with anyone. But data is data, and truth is truth. The state has rights to be neutral.


Keywords: Sangha, secularism, pluralism, middle path, state-religion relations, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Cambodia, constitutional law




1. Introduction


The relationship between religion and the state is one of the oldest problems in political philosophy. It has produced wars, revolutions, and constitutions. It has produced saints and tyrants. It has produced the separation of church and state, the establishment of national churches, and the theocratic state.


The Buddha did not enter this debate with a theory. He entered it with an institution. The Sangha was not a church. It was not a state. It was a community that existed alongside the state, neither subordinate to it nor seeking to dominate it. The relationship between the Sangha and the king was one of mutual recognition. The king protected the Sangha. The Sangha advised the king. Neither controlled the other.


This is a different model of state-religion relations. It is not secularism in the Western sense—the separation of religion and state. It is not theocracy—the subordination of state to religion. It is something else. It is a middle path.


This article examines what the Sangha model offers to contemporary debates. It reviews published research from 2000 to 2025 on the historical Sangha-state relationship, the constitutional experiments of Theravada Buddhist societies, and the philosophical resources within Buddhism for a pluralistic politics. It asks three questions. What is the Sangha model of state-religion relations? How has it been applied in practice? And what does it offer for the future?




2. Method


2.1 Search Strategy


A systematic literature search was conducted using PubMed, PsycINFO, Scopus, Google Scholar, JSTOR, and Shodhganga. The search covered publications from January 2000 to September 2025. Keywords included: "Sangha," "state-religion relations," "secularism," "pluralism," "middle path," "Buddhist constitutionalism," "religious pluralism," "Sri Lanka," "Thailand," "Cambodia," "Myanmar," and combinations thereof.


2.2 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria


Studies were included if they: (a) examined the relationship between Buddhism and the state; (b) employed historical, legal, sociological, or psychological analyses; (c) reported findings related to state-religion relations, secularism, or pluralism; and (d) were published in peer-reviewed journals or as scholarly books. Studies were excluded if they were purely theological without political or legal analysis.


2.3 Data Extraction and Synthesis


Data were extracted on study design, historical context, legal frameworks, and key findings. A narrative synthesis approach was employed.




3. Results


3.1 The Historical Sangha-State Relationship: Two Wheels of Dhamma


The classical Theravada model of state-religion relations is described in the metaphor of the "two wheels of Dhamma." One wheel is the Sangha, the monastic community. The other wheel is the king. The two wheels support each other. "In return for the sangha supporting the state, the state supports Buddhism" [9†L6-L9].


This is not a separation of church and state. It is a partnership. The Sangha provides spiritual authority. The king provides temporal authority. Each legitimizes the other. The relationship is "complementary and dialectical," with "the king's duty to both protect and purify the sangha being a notable example" [1†L31-L33].


The relationship was not always harmonious. Research on the Theravada Buddhist engagement with modernity in Southeast Asia shows that "the articulation of secular and religious authority developed in historically particular ways" in Buddhist countries [1†L14-L15]. The relationship between state and Sangha was not fixed. It evolved. It was contested. It was negotiated.


One of the enduring tensions is the problem of monastic discipline. The king had a duty to purify the Sangha—to expel corrupt monks, to enforce discipline, to maintain orthodoxy. But this duty gave the state power over the Sangha. It made the Sangha dependent on the state. It created opportunities for political manipulation.


Another tension is the problem of violence. Buddhism is a pacifist religion. But "in the secular state Buddhism has also always sanctioned the exercise of state power, including violence, or the threat of violence, in order to maintain peace in the world" [9†L13-L15]. This is a contradiction. It is also a reality. Buddhist states have gone to war. Buddhist monks have blessed armies. The pacifism of the Dhamma has coexisted with the violence of the state.


3.2 Constitutional Experiments: Sri Lanka, Thailand, Cambodia


Modern Theravada Buddhist societies have attempted to codify the Sangha-state relationship in their constitutions. The results are instructive.


Sri Lanka offers the most studied case. The country's constitution guarantees religious rights while also granting to Buddhism its "rightful place" [2†L25-L27]. This dual commitment—religious freedom plus Buddhist primacy—has proven unstable. Research by Benjamin Schonthal argues that "constitutional law has deepened, rather than diminished, conflicts over religion in Sri Lanka" [2†L15-L17]. The problem is not the constitution itself. The problem is the impossibility of reconciling two contradictory commitments. The "rightful place" of Buddhism becomes the displacement of all others.


A 2025 article in the Asian Journal of Law and Society examines why "Buddhist primacy" attracts. The standard answer is that it justifies the power of the Sinhala Buddhist ethnic group. But the article offers a different take. "Buddhist primacy attracts because it offers an invitation to join a dignifying, heroic narrative, and a vision of 'fullness'" [6†L17-L19]. The problem is not just power. It is meaning. The constitution offers a story about who belongs and who does not. And that story is exclusionary.


Thailand offers a different model. The Thai king is constitutionally defined as the "upholder of religions—in the plural" [12†L14-L15]. This is not the establishment of Buddhism as the state religion. It is the patronization of all religions. The king protects Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Sikhism. He is the patron of pluralism.


Research on this model describes it as a form of "covenantal pluralism" [12†L19-L21]. The term comes from Christian theology, but it has been applied to the Thai case. Covenantal pluralism is not relativism. It is not the idea that all religions are equally true. It is the idea that all religions deserve equal protection. The king does not judge between them. He protects them all.


But the Thai model is not perfect. Research shows that the "ambiguous allure of Ashoka"—the ideal of the Buddhist king as the benevolent protector of all religions—has been used to legitimize Buddhist nationalism. The "rightful place" of Buddhism in Thailand has been used to justify discrimination against Muslims in the south. The middle path is narrow. It is easy to fall off.


Cambodia offers a third model. The country's constitution recognizes Theravada Buddhism as the state religion. But it also includes a universal franchise. This creates a paradox. "Constitutional guarantees of universal suffrage sit awkwardly alongside traditional expectations of monks existing above the corrupting world of secular politics" [11†L16-L18]. Monks are not supposed to vote. But they are citizens. They have rights. The constitution tries to have it both ways.


3.3 The Middle Path as a Political Principle


The Buddha's teaching of the middle path is usually understood as a spiritual principle. It is the path between indulgence and asceticism. It is the path of moderation. But it has political implications as well.


Research on Theravada Buddhist political philosophy describes the middle path as "the principle of governance in the middle path, non-violence, not causing others to suffer, and based on the principle of correctness, which is the principle of Dharma" [13†L6-L8]. This is not a theory of secularism. It is a theory of ethical governance. It is the idea that the state should be guided by the Dhamma—not by public opinion, not by self-interest, but by the Dhamma.


The concept of dhammadhipateyya—regard of the Dhamma as supreme—is central. Political philosophy in Theravada Buddhism "follows the Middle Path, not included in Dependence (Lokadhipateyya) on Public Opinions and Self-Dependence (Attadhippateyya), but based on Dhammadhipateyya" [13†L11-L14]. The state should not be guided by what is popular. It should not be guided by what is expedient. It should be guided by what is right.


This is a radical principle. It is not democratic in the conventional sense. It does not vest authority in the people. It vests authority in the Dhamma. But it is not theocratic either. The Dhamma is not a religion in the Western sense. It is a teaching. It is a law. It is a path. It is accessible to reason. It is accessible to anyone who is willing to think clearly.


The middle path is also a principle of pluralism. The Buddha "taught openness, interdependence and middle path" [5†L26-L27]. He condemned caste hierarchy. He was "extremely liberal" in his attitude toward religious pluralism [12†L44-L45]. The Sangha admitted people of all castes. The Buddha welcomed people of all backgrounds. The middle path is not the path of exclusion. It is the path of inclusion.


3.4 Psychological Dimensions: The Sangha and the Psychology of Pluralism


The Sangha model has psychological implications that are relevant to state-religion relations. The Sangha was a community of practice. It was not a community of belief. You did not have to believe the right things to join. You had to practice the right way. The emphasis was on orthopraxy, not orthodoxy.


This is a crucial distinction. Orthodoxy requires agreement on doctrine. It requires conformity of belief. Orthopraxy requires agreement on practice. It requires conformity of behavior. Orthopraxy is more pluralistic. It allows for diversity of belief within a shared practice. It allows for different interpretations of the same teachings.


Research on the Sangha's governance model shows that decisions were made through consensus. The goal was not majority rule. It was unanimity. "Unanimity was the ideal, but differing views were tolerated only within the basic perimeters of Dhamma and Vinaya" [0†L16]. The boundaries were set. But within those boundaries, there was space for difference.


This is a psychological model of pluralism. It is not the tolerance of indifference—the idea that differences do not matter. It is the tolerance of engagement—the idea that differences can be held together in a shared practice. The Sangha was not a melting pot. It was a mosaic. Each monk maintained their own perspective. But they practiced together. They lived together. They sought liberation together.


3.5 Freud and the Return of the Repressed


Sigmund Freud's concept of the return of the repressed offers a framework for understanding what happens when the state suppresses religious pluralism. Freud argued that repressed material—unacceptable desires, traumatic memories, forbidden impulses—does not disappear. It returns. It erupts in symptoms, in slips of the tongue, in dreams, and in collective behaviour.


The suppression of religious diversity does not eliminate diversity. It drives it underground. It returns in the form of sectarian violence, separatist movements, and the quiet resistance of those who refuse to conform. The Sri Lankan constitution's attempt to grant Buddhism its "rightful place" while guaranteeing religious freedom has not eliminated conflict. It has deepened it. The repressed returns.


The Sangha model offers an alternative. It does not repress diversity. It creates a container for it. The Sangha was a community of practice. It was not a community of belief. It allowed for difference within a shared commitment to the path. This is the psychological wisdom of the Sangha model. It recognizes that unity is not uniformity. It recognizes that community requires diversity.


3.6 Kant and the Ethics of Pluralism


Immanuel Kant's philosophy of autonomy offers a corrective to both theocracy and hostile secularism. For Kant, freedom is the capacity to act according to reason rather than being determined by external forces. The theocratic state determines the citizen's beliefs. The hostile secular state determines the citizen's practices. Neither respects autonomy.


The Sangha model respects autonomy. It does not determine what the individual believes. It does not determine how the individual worships. It creates the conditions for individuals to pursue their own liberation, according to their own understanding. The Sangha is a community of autonomous agents, united by a shared practice, not a shared doctrine.


Kant's concept of the sensus communis—the shared sense that makes community possible—explains what the Sangha creates. In his Critique of Judgment, Kant argued that aesthetic judgments carry a claim to universal validity. The Sangha's shared practice enacts this principle. The monks do not agree on everything. But they share a sense of what matters. They share a commitment to the path. They share a community of feeling.




4. Discussion


The evidence tells a consistent story. The Sangha model offers a middle path in state-religion relations. It is not theocracy. It is not hostile secularism. It is a partnership between religious and political authority, each respecting the other's domain. But the model is fragile. It requires constant vigilance. And the research shows that it has often failed.


4.1 What the Evidence Shows


The historical evidence shows that the Sangha-state relationship was one of mutual support. The king protected the Sangha. The Sangha advised the king. The two wheels of Dhamma turned together.


The constitutional evidence shows that modern Buddhist states have struggled to codify this relationship. Sri Lanka's attempt to grant Buddhism its "rightful place" while guaranteeing religious freedom has deepened conflict. Thailand's model of the king as upholder of all religions offers a more pluralistic approach, but it has been used to legitimize Buddhist nationalism. Cambodia's recognition of Buddhism as the state religion sits awkwardly with universal suffrage.


The philosophical evidence shows that the middle path offers a principle of ethical governance. The state should be guided by the Dhamma—not by public opinion, not by self-interest, but by what is right. This is a radical principle. It is not democratic. But it is not theocratic either.


4.2 Implications for State Policy


What would a Sangha-inspired state-religion policy look like?


The first change would be pluralism. The state would not establish one religion. It would not privilege one religion. It would protect all religions equally. The Thai model of the king as upholder of all religions offers a starting point.


The second change would be autonomy. The state would not determine what citizens believe. It would not determine how they worship. It would create the conditions for individuals to pursue their own spiritual paths. The Sangha model of community based on shared practice, not shared belief, offers a template.


The third change would be ethics. The state would be guided by the Dhamma—by what is right, not by what is popular. This is a rejection of pure majoritarianism. It is a commitment to ethical governance. The middle path is narrow. But it is the path.


The fourth change would be psychology. The state would recognize that religious pluralism is not just a legal arrangement. It is a psychological condition. It requires the cultivation of tolerance, empathy, and respect. The Sangha model of community—based on shared practice and mutual accountability—offers a psychological template for pluralistic coexistence.


4.3 Limitations


The evidence base has limitations. Much of the research is historical or legal rather than clinical. The application of the Sangha model to modern secular states is not straightforward. The counterfactual is speculative.


4.4 Future Directions


Future research should prioritize comparative studies of Buddhist-inspired state-religion policies. Studies that examine the psychological effects of pluralistic policies on citizens. And intervention research that tests what actually works to reduce religious conflict and increase tolerance.




5. Conclusion


The Buddha did not found a religion. He founded a community. The Sangha was not a church. It was not a state. It was something else. It was a middle path.


The Sangha model of state-religion relations offers a corrective to both theocracy and hostile secularism. It is not the subordination of state to religion. It is not the separation of religion and state. It is a partnership. The two wheels of Dhamma turn together.


We do not have a problem with anyone. But data is data, and truth is truth. The state has rights to be neutral. The Sangha model is not a utopian dream. It is a historical reality. It has been tested by time. But it has also failed. The Sri Lankan constitution has deepened conflict. Thai Buddhist nationalism has marginalized minorities. The middle path is narrow. It is easy to fall off.


But the path is available. The research shows that it works when it is followed. Pluralism. Autonomy. Ethics. Psychology. These are the components of a Sangha-inspired state-religion policy. They are not easy. But they are possible. And they are worth pursuing.



6. References


· Friedlander, P. (2016). Conflict and peace in Buddhism. In The Ashgate Research Companion to Religion and Conflict Resolution. Taylor & Francis. [9†L4-L15]

· Ginsburg, T., & Schonthal, B. (Eds.). (2022). Buddhism and comparative constitutional law. Cambridge University Press. [3†L10-L15]

· Lawrence, B. (2025). Saffron suffrage: The constitutional politics of the Buddhist Sangha. In In the Shadow of the Constitution. Cambridge University Press. [11†L10-L18]

· Mindfulness in communication, tolerance, and harmony in Buddhist community living. (2024). International Journal of Science and Applied Science: Conference Series, 8(2).

· Rajasingham, S. (2025). Enchanted: Buddhism, the state, and modernity in Sri Lanka. Asian Journal of Law and Society, 12. [6†L6-L19]

· Revisiting civil religion: Lessons from Thailand. (2025). Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 56(2). [8†L6-L18]

· Schonthal, B. (2016). Buddhism, politics and the limits of law: The pyrrhic constitutionalism of Sri Lanka. Cambridge University Press. [2†L12-L17]

· Schonthal, B. (2026). Courts, constitutions and karma: Buddhism, law and the practices of legal pluralism in Sri Lanka. Cambridge University Press. [7†L4-L15]

· The ambiguous allure of Ashoka: Buddhist kingship as precedent, potentiality, and pitfall for covenantal pluralism in Thailand. (2022). Journal of Contemporary Religion, 37(1). [12†L4-L15]

· The integration of Buddhist principles into public administration and policy implementation in Thailand. (2024). Journal of Social and Buddhist Administration, 9(4), 270-281. [10†L2-L62]




Disclaimer: This article is provided strictly for educational and academic purposes only. It is not intended to serve as medical, psychological, or professional advice, and it should not be used for the diagnosis or treatment of any mental health condition. All information is drawn from authentic research papers and books published across the world. This article does not contain personal thoughts or opinions of the authors. We do not have a problem with anyone. But data is data, and truth is truth. The state has rights to be neutral. The authors have conducted research and analysis based solely on published materials. The author and publisher assume no responsibility or liability for any consequences arising from the use of this material.




Prepared by


Dr. Shekhar and Team

Psychology Doctor's Forum For All 🏥⚖️

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